Flexible energy supply companies hampered by lack of policy – pv magazine International

https://www.pv-magazine.com/2019/11/13/flexible-energy-supply-companies-hampered-by-lack-of-policy/

Flexible energy supply companies hampered by lack of policy

Britain’s renewable energy trade body has published a report examining the state of flexibility market readiness in nine European markets. The result makes for sobering reading for Germany, France and the U.K.


With grid operators increasingly aware of the need for flexibility services to accommodate the rising volume of renewable energy generation, British power management company Eaton and utility Drax commissioned a study of how prepared nine European countries are to adopt flexible technology.

The resulting report by the Association for Renewable Energy & Clean Technology (REA) ranked the Netherlands top for the robustness of its regulatory environment and investor attractiveness. Finland was second, followed by Sweden, Denmark, Norway and Ireland with Germany, Britain and France bringing up the rear.

The study included contributions from utilities, industry associations, grid operators, energy technology companies and academics in northern Europe as well as publicly available data, with the countries selected as they are assumed to have similar energy transition ambitions.

The REA scored electricity market readiness for flexibility in the nine markets according to the progress of “open-market access for flexibility services”, “socio-political support for the energy transition” and “ability to exploit new technologies and business models”. Countries that performed well demonstrated a fair, transparent and easily accessible market which had addressed conflicts of interest and eliminated other barriers, the report stated.

The verdict of the report’s authors is that regulators in Germany, Britain and France have failed to provide the necessary legislation to drive the high volume of renewables the three nations claim to want, and have clouded investor sentiment as a result. The Netherlands and Scandinavia, by comparison, boasted regulatory environments which enabled fair and transparent access for flexible supply companies.

Many faces of flexibility

U.K. network operator National Grid showed itself aware of the importance of flexibility in July by publishing a report calling for 13 GW of flexibility systems such as industrial demand-side response and smart EV charging, to achieve decarbonization.

“Decarbonizing power means delivering flexibility,” said REA chief executive Nina Skorupska. “In a world of very low-cost variable renewable electricity generation, grids need to be organized differently and some services which were once taken for granted need to be actively procured.”

With renewable energy prices falling worldwide, and generation capacity rising, Britain had an opportunity to develop world first flexible energy supply solutions which could be exported, said Skorupska.

With technological trials already under way the world over, the REA report states it is politicians, not engineers, which are dragging their heels.

Technical solutions are there

In Cornwall, in southwest England, utility Centrica has just started a trial which involves homeowners and small businesses with solar-plus-storage systems offering their aggregated flexibility services on the same market as big energy companies.

German renewable energy agency the Deutsche Energieagentur in September published a report examining how load shifting in the Chinese aluminum smelting industry alone could move 2.3% of the nation’s average daily energy consumption to time periods better aligned with renewable energy generation.

Solar on track to become No. 1 energy resource by 2035, IEA finds – pv magazine International

https://www.pv-magazine.com/2019/11/13/solar-on-track-to-become-no-1-energy-resource-by-2035-iea-finds/

Solar on track to become No. 1 energy resource by 2035, IEA finds

Just over three terawatts will be installed by 2040. Coal generation will remain largely flat, however. Gas generation capacity will rise, making CO2-emissions reduction unattainable under current projection scenarios.


Solar will become the world’s biggest energy resource in the next decade according to the International Energy Agency’s (IEA) World Energy Outlook report.

Despite the optimistic-sounding headline finding of today’s study, however, the IEA says the volume of anticipated renewable generation capacity, rather than displacing fossil fuel power, will do little more than keep up with rising demand for electricity.

The volume of electricity generation rose 7% – 450 TWh last year, compared to 2017. That explains why global coal capacity will likely remain flat at around 2.2 TW from next year to 2040. Gas generation capacity is expected to increase from nearly 1.9 TW to 2.65 TW during that time and 3,142 GW of solar will overtake the capacity of wind next year (715 GW), hydro in 2027 (1,522 GW), coal in 2032 (2,120 GW) and gas in 2035 (2,476 GW) to become the world’s biggest energy supplier.

The IEA says the world will see power generation capacity additions of around 8.5 TW up to 2040, of which around two-thirds will be renewables. In China and the EU, renewables will account for 80% of new capacity but clean energy will add up to less than half of new installations worldwide.

Solar is the most popular source of new renewables capacity in most parts of the world, says the IEA. In China, for example, PV will comprise 44% of all renewable capacity additions until 2040. In Japan, that figure will be 53%, in India 46%. In the EU, solar will supply 29% of new renewables capacity up to 2040, to trail wind’s 39%. In central and South America, solar is on par with wind at 18%, and behind hydro, which will supply 26%.

The IEA said $390 billion was invested in renewables last year, a slight fall from 2017. Under the agency’s “stated policies scenario”, the figure is expected to rise to an average $440 billion per year through 2030. The agency says $650 billion per year will be required to meet energy-related sustainable development goals.

Solar investment from 2017 t0 2018 fell 4% to $135 billion largely as a result of China’s decision to rein in solar subsidies. Looking further out, the IEA claims that investments in solar PV will fall to $116 billion annually in the SPS. Should the world follow what would be needed for an SDS that figure would rise to $169 to $189 billion in 2030 to 2040, respectively. This presumed decrease in investments makes solar the only renewable energy resource which’s market volume in terms of investment could decrease in an SPS. The drop would be -7%, while wind would increase by 37% for comparison. In an SDS, solar PV investments would grow by 41% while wind investments would be up 151%.

Yet still, solar PV is poised for robust growth. Sitting at 592 TWh in 2018, the agency believes that with the SPS, that number will hit 2562 TWh in 2030, and 4705 in 2040, or fivefold and eightfold, respectively. In the SDS solar with grow to 3513 TWh by 2030, and 7208 by 2040.

McCrone: Electric Cars and the Response of Tax-Strapped Governments | BloombergNEF

https://about.bnef.com/blog/mccrone-electric-cars-response-tax-strapped-governments/

McCrone: Electric Cars and the Response of Tax-Strapped Governments

October 29, 2018

By Angus McCrone
Chief Editor
BloombergNEF

Honeymoons are a time of passion. Afterward, the mood may cool just a little as the realities of washing dishes and paying mortgages sink in.

Electric vehicles are currently in a honeymoon phase. You can see that in investors’ eyes: according to BNEF’s figures, Chinese EV companies accounted for the six largest venture capital and private equity new money deals in clean energy globally in the first three-quarters of 2018.

Many governments are also feeling the “lurve” for EVs. Policies have been encouraging motorists to go electric, because ministers want to be seen to be acting to reduce CO2 emissions and urban pollution. Some countries have been offering subsidies.

The honeymoon passion of governments in developed economies for electric cars is likely to fade a bit as the EV market grows. One reason lies in public finances and their reliance on tax revenues from road fuel.

OECD figures show that the Group of Seven advanced economies raised some $223 billion in excise duty and local taxes on hydrocarbon oils in 2016. And then there was the revenue raised in value added tax or sales tax on gasoline and diesel – probably somewhere in the $50-100 billion range.

The degree of dependency on taxing road fuel varies within the G7: I estimate from less than 2% of total government tax revenue in the case of the U.S., to 4% in the case of Germany and more than 5% in the case of the U.K. – equivalent in money almost to what that country spent on defense in 2016. For all of the G7, road fuel taxation is important enough to create a hole in the public accounts if it disappeared.

Fading tax source

Disappear is what it looks like doing, albeit gradually, as gas-guzzling cars get displaced by electric models. BNEF’s Long-Term Electric Vehicle Outlook, published in May, shows the cost of electric cars falling in the years ahead, largely due to deflation in lithium-ion battery prices. By the mid-to-late 2020s, EVs will be cheaper than internal combustion engine, or ICE, vehicles on both a lifetime-cost and an upfront-cost basis.

ICE cars will not, of course, vanish from the roads at that moment. Gasoline and diesel will continue to be needed. Our forecast has EVs making up 55% of global new light-duty vehicle sales in 2040, but “only” 33% of the total fleet. The figures for individual countries will vary around that average, so for instance Germany would reach 76% of new car sales and 55% of the fleet by that date.

With the total number of cars on the road hardly growing any more in most G7 countries, the prospect is for the absolute number of ICEs to fall sharply during the 2030s, if not before. Meanwhile, the impact on the tax take may be magnified by three other factors. The first is that makers of ICE cars will be trying their hardest over the next decade and more to improve fuel economy in order to stay competitive with EVs, so each conventional vehicle is likely to need significantly less fuel. BNEF clients can see our estimate of this effect to 2040 in Figure 102 of BNEF’s Electric Vehicle Outlook report.

The second is that some other road transport sectors will also go electric, so reducing or eliminating their thirst for hydrocarbon fuels. BNEF sees electric buses making even faster inroads into their market than electric cars. By the late 2020s, delivery vans and two-wheelers may be going the same way.

The third is that many of the car drivers who do go electric in the early years will be very heavy road users looking to cut the costs of their high annual mileage.

BNEF’s Electric Vehicle Outlook does not assume any particular changes in taxation of fuel, electricity or vehicles in the coming decades. That is sensible: a forecast should concentrate on the economics and not try to second-guess the future actions of politicians.

But, in practice, changes in tax policy there may well be. Before discussing some of those, and what effect they might have on the EV revolution, we need to look at the question of timing.

Timing of the tax impact

How quickly will the advance of EVs impact government finances? Well, in a small way it is already. To take the U.K. example, electric vehicles made up 1.9% of new car sales in 2017, and a far lower proportion of the total fleet. The pure battery EV subset made up just 0.15% of licensed cars in 2017, according to the Department of Transport. Nevertheless, my estimate is that this means the U.K. government received 23 million pounds less in road fuel excise duty than it would have done if the same vehicles had instead been average ICEs.

OK, that is not a lot for a large economy. But the figure is only going to escalate. By the way, I simplified the calculation by leaving out plug-in hybrids, which are generally classed as a type of EV but use some road fuel as well as electricity. And I also left out VAT – both the tax charged at 20% on road fuel and that charged at 5% on electricity.

BNEF forecasts that EVs will make up 3% of the total European Union car fleet by 2025, rising to 12% in 2030, to 28% by 2035 and 45% by 2040. Meanwhile, the number of internal combustion engine cars sold in the EU will peak in 2022, and the total number on the road will top out in 2025 at 267.8 million. The latter figure is seen falling 9% by 2030 and 41% by 2040. It would be reasonable to expect the tax take on light-duty vehicle road fuel to fall by at least those percentages.

There would be a minor offset in the shape of extra VAT on the electricity used to charge EVs. However, the cost of the electricity per mile would only be a fraction of the cost of hydrocarbon fuel per mile.

Pile more pain on ICE vehicles

One way of recouping the shortfall in tax on road fuel would be to load even more taxation onto the gasoline and diesel vehicles that remain – probably by raising the rate of excise duty or local road fuel tax. This might be welcome for the EV industry and for environmentalists, since it would add to the urgency for drivers to drop their fossil fuel cars and go electric instead.

The disadvantages would be three. First of all, the extra road fuel tax would fall not just on diehard ICE fans (the famed “petrol heads”) but also on those driving around in old cars because they could not afford to buy new ones. France is currently trying to square this circle by increasing the cost of road fuel via a carbon tax, while also offering incentives for low-income households to buy electric cars.

Second, parts of the transport fleet that had not electrified, for instance trucks, would face heavy increases in their fuel bills. The trucking industry tends to be a powerful lobby.

The third disadvantage is a practical one to do with public finances. Turning the screw on ICE drivers would probably be so effective that it would push them onto electrics at an accelerated pace, eroding further the government’s tax revenues.

Put a tax on distance traveled

The most obvious way to tax distance traveled would be by taking a monthly or annual read-out from a car’s odometer, otherwise known as mileage clock. This would have to be transmitted electronically to a tax office or charging center, making the instrument akin to a smart meter.

That remote charging entity would then bill car owners. The amount per mile or kilometer could vary depending on the type of vehicle. For ease-of-collection purposes, the fees would be taken automatically from bank accounts. There could be a pay-as-you-go variant in which vehicle owners would pay upfront for a certain number of miles or kilometers.

Tampering might be a problem – although telematics are established in commercial vehicles in some countries to check that regulations are being observed. And enforcement of collection could be laborious and acrimonious, possibly involving the seizure or immobilization of the vehicle.

There would also be the question of how this tax could be made to apply to older vehicles already on the road. Would a new-tech odometer really be retrofitted to Uncle Henry’s 1952 Bugatti, or for that matter to the hundreds of millions of cars sold over the last two decades and still being driven?

As far as the low-carbon transition in transport is concerned, this idea could be neutral or negative. Neutral if it coincided with the continuing collection of tax on gasoline and diesel, so the incentive to switch to electric (or simply from a thirsty ICE model to a more economical one) would be very much in place.

Negative if tax on hydrocarbon road fuel ended when this new tax came in, delaying the tipping point when lifetime costs of choosing electric go below those of staying with fossil fuels. Or negative if this charge on distance traveled were only applied to electric models, with gasoline and diesel cars continuing to pay existing fuel duties.

Put a tax on road use

The likelihood is that a road use charge would rely on the introduction of new tolls on thousands of major, minor and urban roads – probably policed by camera rather than old-fashioned tolling barrier, and payable by internet.

Like the mileage levy above, it could be charged at a flat rate, or more likely graduated according either to the emissions of the vehicle concerned, or its weight – and therefore likely wear and tear on the road surface.

The concept in some ways is superior to the mileage levy, in that a road use charge could be graduated according to the actual route taken, and even whether the driving was done around rush hour or at quiet times of day or night. The latter might mean that it would contribute to reducing congestion and thereby increasing economic output.

Those are the benefits. As with the previous option, it could be neutral or negative for EVs, depending on whether road fuel taxes were retained, or abolished, with its introduction.

The appearance of a large number of new cameras on roads, and the collection of vast amounts of additional data on the movements of individual cars, would lead to opposition on civil liberties grounds in some countries. Other places that already have large numbers of cameras checking out for speeding, or like Japan and South Korea already have a big network of road tolls, might find their populations less worried about ‘Big Brother’ issues.

Skeptics might be partially reassured if it was written into law that the proceeds of the road use tax would be used solely to pay for new highway building, improvements and maintenance.

Increase tax on EV electricity use

And then we move onto taxes on EVs alone. Any dilution of the economic case for drivers to switch away from gasoline or diesel cars would be a retrograde step from a climate point of view. However, that does not rule out certain governments choosing to take this approach.

Such a tax could come in at least two forms. The first would be to impose a tax on charging, so that every time an electric car driver plugged in, that electricity used would be subject to a special government impost.

The problem here is that it might be possible to implement this at public charging points, but it would be hard to do so in the home because drivers could simply use the same power socket that is connected to their fridge or kettle. That is, unless a fraud-proof way can be found – inside the home or the vehicle – to meter the electricity flowing into a car battery as opposed to other appliances.

The simpler version would be for governments to lift taxation of all electricity by a significant amount. That would force EV drivers to pay more, in proportion to the amount of charging they needed to do, and therefore to the amount of driving they did.

But additional, blanket electricity taxation would run into howls of protest from consumers. Those not owning cars would complain at having to pay higher bills, and the old and poor might be disproportionately affected.

Registration fees for EVs

A final possibility that might tilt the playing field away from EVs would be the introduction of special registration fees for electric cars. According to the Sierra Club, by April this year there were 17 U.S. states with annual registration fees for electric vehicles, and another nine considering them. In many cases, these fees are above those for conventional cars.

For instance, the state of Tennessee’s Department of Revenue says on its website: “Currently, the registration fee for a hybrid is the same as all other private passenger vehicles, the state fee is $26.50. Electric car drivers will be charged a $100 registration fee in addition to the standard registration fee.”

The Indiana Department of Revenue said in 2017: “HEA 1002 created new supplemental registration fees for hybrid and electric vehicles. These new fees apply to registrations of all hybrid and electric vehicles and will be due and payable each year during the registration renewal process. The supplemental registration fee for hybrid vehicles is $50 per vehicle, while the supplemental registration fee for electric vehicles is $150 per vehicle.”

Such measures erode the relative economic appeal of EVs – even if only to a small extent. That means they are retrograde steps from the point of view of controlling emissions.

The registration fees in some U.S. states could end up giving a boost to plug-in hybrids, or PHEVs, at the expense of pure battery electrics. PHEVs made up 36% of all EV sales globally in 2017, and are forecast to still be 24% of that market in 2025. But they use some gasoline as well as being chargeable from mains electricity.

Possible impact

Above, I have outlined a range of measures that governments could choose from, in order to raise revenue to make up for the approaching shrinkage in their tax take from road fuel. Road use charging applied to all vehicles would appear to be the most elegant option from the point of view of reducing emissions and improving the flow of traffic. For EV sales prospects, it would matter whether such a tax co-existed with current road fuel duties, or whether it replaced them.

It is hard to imagine a government response to the tax issue that would prevent the eventual conversion of vehicle fleets to electric, but there are a few options that might affect the speed of the EV revolution over the next two decades. BNEF will be examining in more depth both the issue and the choices, particularly as it affects Europe, in a research note to be published in the coming months.

National treasuries and economics ministries have so far paid insufficient attention to the low-carbon transition, except for the impact of subsidies on electricity bills. As I argued in a VIP Comment article last August, How Economies May Flex to Transition in Energy, Transport, that transition is starting to become significant for a range of macroeconomic indicators, from GDP growth and inflation, to trade and jobs and tax revenue.

It’s time for finance ministers to start getting to know those “what’s-their-name” colleagues in their governments’ energy and transport departments.

About BloombergNEF

BloombergNEF (BNEF), Bloomberg’s primary research service, covers clean energy, advanced transport, digital industry, innovative materials and commodities. We help corporate strategy, finance and policy professionals navigate change and generate opportunities.

Available online, on mobile and on the Terminal, BNEF is powered by Bloomberg’s global network of 19,000 employees in 176 locations, reporting 5,000 news stories a day.

Sign up for our free weekly newsletter →

Unplanned solar plant repairs to cost industry $16 billion over next 6 years | Wood Mackenzie

https://www.woodmac.com/press-releases/unplanned-solar-plant-repairs-to-cost-industry-$16-billion-over-next-6-years/

Unplanned solar plant repairs to cost industry $16 billion over next 6 years

08 October 2019
News Release

Annual solar plant operations and maintenance (O&M) costs will grow from nearly $4.5 billion in 2019 to just over $9 billion in 2024. This increase is due to future demand growth and current installed capacity. Unplanned repairs alone can cost owners up to $3,000/MW/year, based on an average-sized solar power system of 50MW, according to new research from Wood Mackenzie.

Global solar demand on the rise

After a modest decline in 2018, the global solar market will reach a new annual high of 114.5GW in 2019 – up 18% from the previous year. Annual installations will sit at 120-125 GW in the early 2020s as emerging markets begin to deliver results. Global cumulative solar PV installations are expected to grow from ~500GWdc in 2018 to 1,243 GWdc by 2024. China, India and the US concentrate more than 50% of global solar PV installations to 2024, making both APAC and North America the most attractive regions within the solar O&M segment.

Solar installations nearing inverter end of life will reach 21GW by the end of 2019, representing 3.4% of the global market. This increases to more than 14% of the total cumulative capacity over the following five years. By 2024, Wood Mackenzie expects the solar industry to have 176GW of projects with inverters older than ten years.

Despite being the most significant and major component of a solar project, replacement of a solar inverter represents only 12-13% of the average O&M cost of a ~50MW solar power system. By 2024, inverter replacement costs alone will reach nearly $1.2 billion out of a total O&M opportunity of $9.4 billion. Other areas that have a significant impact on costs are regular preventative maintenance and corrective repairs, representing 35% and 24% respectively.

Expand unplanned-solar-plant-repairs_media-image.png?width=800&height=480&mode=max

Digital technology to optimise solar market

“Solar technology has greatly improved technician utilisation ratios over the last few years. Previously, one technician would be able to service 20MW of solar capacity. Global downward price pressures have driven the implementation of automated solutions and digital platforms, making it possible for technicians to service from 40MW-60MW of solar capacity – more than doubling their efficiency in some cases.

“As asset owners and operators continue to invest in advanced analytics and O&M specific software, and move from more time-consuming methods of spreadsheet-based analytics, operational costs will be reduced and higher data quality achieved,” said Leila Garcia da Fonseca, Wood Mackenzie Principal Analyst.

Getting all systems to speak same language will be challenging

Solar plant management is often erroneously assumed to be simplistic when compared to other generation technologies.

“Everything looks beautiful on paper until questions arise about how beneficial these systems can be after the plant asset managers realise they aren’t able to communicate with the existing data structure. This is especially true in older solar projects where components are not sophisticated enough to handle multiple communication protocols. Therefore, there is little benefit to implementing costly, state-of-the-art advanced analytics platforms on older equipment.

“Although a significant portion of solar PV projects have a monitoring system implemented, few are synced in real-time with diagnostics tools in place. Even fewer conduct basic periodical performance assessments. Ideally, asset owners would have all operations running autonomously and linked to an Enterprise Resource Planning System (ERP). However, an end-to-end digital platform is not yet a reality. Asset operators might deploy some of the digital solutions available but have yet to use this advanced of a digital ecosystem,” added Ms. Garcia da Fonseca.

Is investment in a digital platform worth it?

The future is undoubtedly digital. Nevertheless, not all facilities and asset owners are ready to implement digital solutions.

“It doesn’t make sense for owners of projects close to end-of-life to deploy an expensive and intelligent platform. It wouldn’t make sense technically, nor commercially, as the data acquisition system might not support all digital system requirements. The economics just don’t add up.

“In order for big data adoption to ramp up, two things need to happen. Asset owners must realise the benefits a digital platform can bring to their asset management tasks. Additionally, results from systems with established advanced analytics must be more widespread among the industry,” concluded Ms. Garcia da Fonseca.

Solar and Wind Power So Cheap They’re Outgrowing Subsidies – Bloomberg

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2019-09-19/solar-and-wind-power-so-cheap-they-re-outgrowing-subsidies

Solar and Wind Power So Cheap They’re Outgrowing Subsidies

The government aid renewable energy developers once relied on is fading away

More stories by Mark Chediak19 September 2019, 11:00 BST
undefined
Solar panels redirect the sun’s rays near Seville, Spain.
Photographer: Markel Redondo/Bloomberg
By Mark Chediak
and Brian Eckhouse

From

LISTEN TO ARTICLE

For years, wind and solar power were derided as boondoggles. They were too expensive, the argument went, to build without government handouts.

Today, renewable energy is so cheap that the handouts they once needed are disappearing.

On sun-drenched fields across Spain and Italy, developers are building solar farms without subsidies or tax-breaks, betting they can profit without them. In China, the government plans to stop financially supporting new wind farms. And in the U.S., developers are signing shorter sales contracts, opting to depend on competitive markets for revenue once the agreements expire.

relates to Solar and Wind Power So Cheap They’re Outgrowing Subsidies
The developments have profound implications for the push to phase out fossil fuels and slow the onset of climate change. Electricity generation and heating account for 25% of global greenhouse gases. As wind and solar demonstrate they can compete on their own against coal- and natural gas-fired plants, the economic and political arguments in favor of carbon-free power become harder and harder to refute.

“The training wheels are off,” said Joe Osha, an equity analyst at JMP Securities. “Prices have declined enough for both solar and wind that there’s a path toward continued deployment in a post-subsidy world.”

Subsidy-Free Europe

The reason, in short, is the subsidies worked. After decades of quotas, tax breaks and feed-in-tariffs, wind and solar have been deployed widely enough for manufacturers and developers to become increasingly efficient and drive down costs. The cost of wind power has fallen about 50% since 2010. Solar has dropped 85%. That makes them cheaper than new coal and gas plants in two-thirds of the world, according to BloombergNEF.

“Solar got cheap,” said Jenny Chase, an analyst at BNEF. “It’s really that simple.”

China Huaneng Group Windfarm in Eastern China

Wind turbines spin in Qidong, China.
Photographer: Qilai Shen/Bloomberg
Yet for all it’s promise, clean energy still has a long way to go before fully usurping coal and gas. Wind and solar still only accounted for about 7% of electricity generation worldwide last year, according to BNEF. And most wind and solar projects still depend on subsides. In the U.S., in fact, the solar industry is pushing to extend federal tax credits that are scheduled to decline over the next few years.

And then there’s the issue of round-the-clock power. Solar doesn’t work at night. Wind farms go idle when breezes slack. So until battery systems are cheap enough for generators to stockpile electricity for hours at a time, renewables can’t constantly provide power like coal and gas.

Solar module prices have plunged this decade

Perhaps nowhere is the push toward subsidy-free clean energy clearer than on arid expanses of Southern Europe. About 750 megawatts of subsidy-free clean-energy projects are expected to connect to the grid in 2019 alone, across Spain, Italy, Portugal and elsewhere — enough to power about 333,000 households, according to Pietro Radoia, an analyst at BNEF.

“The cheapest way of producing electricity in Spain is the sun,” Jose Dominguez Abascal, the nation’s secretary of state for energy, said last year.

Read More: Bill Gates Says Wind, Solar Subsidies Should Go to Something New

The road to subsidy-free renewables wasn’t easy for Spain. A decade ago, it offered developers a lavish feed-in tariff, prompting an uncontrolled boom that strained the national treasury. Spain slashed incentives and now has a hands-off energy policy.

China, the world’s largest renewable energy market, also propped up wind and solar for years. Now it’s shifting toward a more market-driven approach. Earlier this year, officials announced a plan to develop 20.8 gigawatts of renewable projects that can only profit from selling electricity into grids at prices equal to or less than coal. Plus, most wind farms built on land — as opposed to in the ocean — won’t be eligible for subsidies after 2021.

READ MORE: Bill Gates Says Wind, Solar Subsidies Should Go to Something New

Cheaper Wind

The picture is less clear in the U.S. Nearly every American wind and solar project remains eligible for subsidies through federal tax breaks, which are scheduled to decrease or phase out altogether over the next few years. Plus, dozens of states have renewable-energy quotas, forcing utilities to buy a certain amount of wind and solar.

Still, they’re starting to compete on their own. The proof is in the sales agreements. For years, clean-energy developers needed 20- or 25-year power-purchase contracts to ensure a return on investment. Now they’re building wind and solar farms with agreements for 15 years or less — with the expectation that projects will compete against gas- and coal-fired plants in wholesale markets after the deals conclude.

“Renewable energy’s next major evolutionary step is to sell power directly into wholesale markets,” said Richard Matsui, chief executive officer at San Francisco-based solar risk-management firm KWh Analytics. “Investors worldwide are only beginning to dip their toes in those waters.”

(Michael R. Bloomberg, the founder and majority stakeholder of Bloomberg LP, the parent company of Bloomberg News, has committed $500 million to launch Beyond Carbon, a campaign aimed at closing the remaining coal-powered plants in the U.S. by 2030 and slowing the construction of new gas plants.)

This story is part of Covering Climate Now, a global collaboration of more than 250 news outlets to highlight climate change.

— With assistance by James Thornhill, Reed Landberg, Jasmine Ng, Jeremy Hodges, and Chris Martin

Regards,

Rob Such

rob
07900 488 936
01344 988 775
www.rsrenewables.com

@rsrenewables
RS Renewables Ltd stores and uses personal data to be able work with you in relation to a contract we have/are working to put in place with you or the company you represent, or to investigate whether you would be interested in working with RS Renewables Ltd. Please see our info

What if We Stopped Pretending the Climate Apocalypse Can Be Stopped? | The New Yorker

Interesting prospective on climate change, worth reading the whole article.

https://www.newyorker.com/culture/cultural-comment/what-if-we-stopped-pretending?utm_medium=email&utm_source=dailynewsletter&utm_campaign=20092019

The climate apocalypse is coming. To prepare for it, we need to admit that we can’t prevent it.

The climate apocalypse is coming. To prepare for it, we need to admit that we can’t prevent it.

Jonathan Franzen
“There is infinite hope,” Kafka tells us, “only not for us.” This is a fittingly mystical epigram from a writer whose characters strive for ostensibly reachable goals and, tragically or amusingly, never manage to get any closer to them. But it seems to me, in our rapidly darkening world, that the converse of Kafka’s quip is equally true: There is no hope, except for us.

I’m talking, of course, about climate change. The struggle to rein in global carbon emissions and keep the planet from melting down has the feel of Kafka’s fiction. The goal has been clear for thirty years, and despite earnest efforts we’ve made essentially no progress toward reaching it. Today, the scientific evidence verges on irrefutable. If you’re younger than sixty, you have a good chance of witnessing the radical destabilization of life on earth—massive crop failures, apocalyptic fires, imploding economies, epic flooding, hundreds of millions of refugees fleeing regions made uninhabitable by extreme heat or permanent drought. If you’re under thirty, you’re all but guaranteed to witness it.

If you care about the planet, and about the people and animals who live on it, there are two ways to think about this. You can keep on hoping that catastrophe is preventable, and feel ever more frustrated or enraged by the world’s inaction. Or you can accept that disaster is coming, and begin to rethink what it means to have hope.

Even at this late date, expressions of unrealistic hope continue to abound. Hardly a day seems to pass without my reading that it’s time to “roll up our sleeves” and “save the planet”; that the problem of climate change can be “solved” if we summon the collective will. Although this message was probably still true in 1988, when the science became fully clear, we’ve emitted as much atmospheric carbon in the past thirty years as we did in the previous two centuries of industrialization. The facts have changed, but somehow the message stays the same.

Psychologically, this denial makes sense. Despite the outrageous fact that I’ll soon be dead forever, I live in the present, not the future. Given a choice between an alarming abstraction (death) and the reassuring evidence of my senses (breakfast!), my mind prefers to focus on the latter. The planet, too, is still marvelously intact, still basically normal—seasons changing, another election year coming, new comedies on Netflix—and its impending collapse is even harder to wrap my mind around than death. Other kinds of apocalypse, whether religious or thermonuclear or asteroidal, at least have the binary neatness of dying: one moment the world is there, the next moment it’s gone forever. Climate apocalypse, by contrast, is messy. It will take the form of increasingly severe crises compounding chaotically until civilization begins to fray. Things will get very bad, but maybe not too soon, and maybe not for everyone. Maybe not for me.

Some of the denial, however, is more willful. The evil of the Republican Party’s position on climate science is well known, but denial is entrenched in progressive politics, too, or at least in its rhetoric. The Green New Deal, the blueprint for some of the most substantial proposals put forth on the issue, is still framed as our last chance to avert catastrophe and save the planet, by way of gargantuan renewable-energy projects. Many of the groups that support those proposals deploy the language of “stopping” climate change, or imply that there’s still time to prevent it. Unlike the political right, the left prides itself on listening to climate scientists, who do indeed allow that catastrophe is theoretically avertable. But not everyone seems to be listening carefully. The stress falls on the word theoretically.

Our atmosphere and oceans can absorb only so much heat before climate change, intensified by various feedback loops, spins completely out of control. The consensus among scientists and policy-makers is that we’ll pass this point of no return if the global mean temperature rises by more than two degrees Celsius (maybe a little more, but also maybe a little less). The I.P.C.C.—the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change—tells us that, to limit the rise to less than two degrees, we not only need to reverse the trend of the past three decades. We need to approach zero net emissions, globally, in the next three decades.

This is, to say the least, a tall order. It also assumes that you trust the I.P.C.C.’s calculations. New research, described last month in Scientific American, demonstrates that climate scientists, far from exaggerating the threat of climate change, have underestimated its pace and severity. To project the rise in the global mean temperature, scientists rely on complicated atmospheric modelling. They take a host of variables and run them through supercomputers to generate, say, ten thousand different simulations for the coming century, in order to make a “best” prediction of the rise in temperature. When a scientist predicts a rise of two degrees Celsius, she’s merely naming a number about which she’s very confident: the rise will be at least two degrees. The rise might, in fact, be far higher.

As a non-scientist, I do my own kind of modelling. I run various future scenarios through my brain, apply the constraints of human psychology and political reality, take note of the relentless rise in global energy consumption (thus far, the carbon savings provided by renewable energy have been more than offset by consumer demand), and count the scenarios in which collective action averts catastrophe. The scenarios, which I draw from the prescriptions of policy-makers and activists, share certain necessary conditions.

The first condition is that every one of the world’s major polluting countries institute draconian conservation measures, shut down much of its energy and transportation infrastructure, and completely retool its economy. According to a recent paper in Nature, the carbon emissions from existing global infrastructure, if operated through its normal lifetime, will exceed our entire emissions “allowance”—the further gigatons of carbon that can be released without crossing the threshold of catastrophe. (This estimate does not include the thousands of new energy and transportation projects already planned or under construction.) To stay within that allowance, a top-down intervention needs to happen not only in every country but throughout every country. Making New York City a green utopia will not avail if Texans keep pumping oil and driving pickup trucks.

The actions taken by these countries must also be the right ones. Vast sums of government money must be spent without wasting it and without lining the wrong pockets. Here it’s useful to recall the Kafkaesque joke of the European Union’s biofuel mandate, which served to accelerate the deforestation of Indonesia for palm-oil plantations, and the American subsidy of ethanol fuel, which turned out to benefit no one but corn farmers.

Finally, overwhelming numbers of human beings, including millions of government-hating Americans, need to accept high taxes and severe curtailment of their familiar life styles without revolting. They must accept the reality of climate change and have faith in the extreme measures taken to combat it. They can’t dismiss news they dislike as fake. They have to set aside nationalism and class and racial resentments. They have to make sacrifices for distant threatened nations and distant future generations. They have to be permanently terrified by hotter summers and more frequent natural disasters, rather than just getting used to them. Every day, instead of thinking about breakfast, they have to think about death.

Call me a pessimist or call me a humanist, but I don’t see human nature fundamentally changing anytime soon. I can run ten thousand scenarios through my model, and in not one of them do I see the two-degree target being met.

To judge from recent opinion polls, which show that a majority of Americans (many of them Republican) are pessimistic about the planet’s future, and from the success of a book like David Wallace-Wells’s harrowing “The Uninhabitable Earth,” which was released this year, I’m not alone in having reached this conclusion. But there continues to be a reluctance to broadcast it. Some climate activists argue that if we publicly admit that the problem can’t be solved, it will discourage people from taking any ameliorative action at all. This seems to me not only a patronizing calculation but an ineffectual one, given how little progress we have to show for it to date. The activists who make it remind me of the religious leaders who fear that, without the promise of eternal salvation, people won’t bother to behave well. In my experience, nonbelievers are no less loving of their neighbors than believers. And so I wonder what might happen if, instead of denying reality, we told ourselves the truth.

First of all, even if we can no longer hope to be saved from two degrees of warming, there’s still a strong practical and ethical case for reducing carbon emissions. In the long run, it probably makes no difference how badly we overshoot two degrees; once the point of no return is passed, the world will become self-transforming. In the shorter term, however, half measures are better than no measures. Halfway cutting our emissions would make the immediate effects of warming somewhat less severe, and it would somewhat postpone the point of no return. The most terrifying thing about climate change is the speed at which it’s advancing, the almost monthly shattering of temperature records. If collective action resulted in just one fewer devastating hurricane, just a few extra years of relative stability, it would be a goal worth pursuing.

In fact, it would be worth pursuing even if it had no effect at all. To fail to conserve a finite resource when conservation measures are available, to needlessly add carbon to the atmosphere when we know very well what carbon is doing to it, is simply wrong. Although the actions of one individual have zero effect on the climate, this doesn’t mean that they’re meaningless. Each of us has an ethical choice to make. During the Protestant Reformation, when “end times” was merely an idea, not the horribly concrete thing it is today, a key doctrinal question was whether you should perform good works because it will get you into Heaven, or whether you should perform them simply because they’re good—because, while Heaven is a question mark, you know that this world would be better if everyone performed them. I can respect the planet, and care about the people with whom I share it, without believing that it will save me.

More than that, a false hope of salvation can be actively harmful. If you persist in believing that catastrophe can be averted, you commit yourself to tackling a problem so immense that it needs to be everyone’s overriding priority forever. One result, weirdly, is a kind of complacency: by voting for green candidates, riding a bicycle to work, avoiding air travel, you might feel that you’ve done everything you can for the only thing worth doing. Whereas, if you accept the reality that the planet will soon overheat to the point of threatening civilization, there’s a whole lot more you should be doing.

Our resources aren’t infinite. Even if we invest much of them in a longest-shot gamble, reducing carbon emissions in the hope that it will save us, it’s unwise to invest all of them. Every billion dollars spent on high-speed trains, which may or may not be suitable for North America, is a billion not banked for disaster preparedness, reparations to inundated countries, or future humanitarian relief. Every renewable-energy mega-project that destroys a living ecosystem—the “green” energy development now occurring in Kenya’s national parks, the giant hydroelectric projects in Brazil, the construction of solar farms in open spaces, rather than in settled areas—erodes the resilience of a natural world already fighting for its life. Soil and water depletion, overuse of pesticides, the devastation of world fisheries—collective will is needed for these problems, too, and, unlike the problem of carbon, they’re within our power to solve. As a bonus, many low-tech conservation actions (restoring forests, preserving grasslands, eating less meat) can reduce our carbon footprint as effectively as massive industrial changes.

All-out war on climate change made sense only as long as it was winnable. Once you accept that we’ve lost it, other kinds of action take on greater meaning. Preparing for fires and floods and refugees is a directly pertinent example. But the impending catastrophe heightens the urgency of almost any world-improving action. In times of increasing chaos, people seek protection in tribalism and armed force, rather than in the rule of law, and our best defense against this kind of dystopia is to maintain functioning democracies, functioning legal systems, functioning communities. In this respect, any movement toward a more just and civil society can now be considered a meaningful climate action. Securing fair elections is a climate action. Combatting extreme wealth inequality is a climate action. Shutting down the hate machines on social media is a climate action. Instituting humane immigration policy, advocating for racial and gender equality, promoting respect for laws and their enforcement, supporting a free and independent press, ridding the country of assault weapons—these are all meaningful climate actions. To survive rising temperatures, every system, whether of the natural world or of the human world, will need to be as strong and healthy as we can make it.

And then there’s the matter of hope. If your hope for the future depends on a wildly optimistic scenario, what will you do ten years from now, when the scenario becomes unworkable even in theory? Give up on the planet entirely? To borrow from the advice of financial planners, I might suggest a more balanced portfolio of hopes, some of them longer-term, most of them shorter. It’s fine to struggle against the constraints of human nature, hoping to mitigate the worst of what’s to come, but it’s just as important to fight smaller, more local battles that you have some realistic hope of winning. Keep doing the right thing for the planet, yes, but also keep trying to save what you love specifically—a community, an institution, a wild place, a species that’s in trouble—and take heart in your small successes. Any good thing you do now is arguably a hedge against the hotter future, but the really meaningful thing is that it’s good today. As long as you have something to love, you have something to hope for.

In Santa Cruz, where I live, there’s an organization called the Homeless Garden Project. On a small working farm at the west end of town, it offers employment, training, support, and a sense of community to members of the city’s homeless population. It can’t “solve” the problem of homelessness, but it’s been changing lives, one at a time, for nearly thirty years. Supporting itself in part by selling organic produce, it contributes more broadly to a revolution in how we think about people in need, the land we depend on, and the natural world around us. In the summer, as a member of its C.S.A. program, I enjoy its kale and strawberries, and in the fall, because the soil is alive and uncontaminated, small migratory birds find sustenance in its furrows.

There may come a time, sooner than any of us likes to think, when the systems of industrial agriculture and global trade break down and homeless people outnumber people with homes. At that point, traditional local farming and strong communities will no longer just be liberal buzzwords. Kindness to neighbors and respect for the land—nurturing healthy soil, wisely managing water, caring for pollinators—will be essential in a crisis and in whatever society survives it. A project like the Homeless Garden offers me the hope that the future, while undoubtedly worse than the present, might also, in some ways, be better. Most of all, though, it gives me hope for today.

Jonathan Franzen is a frequent contributor to The New Yorker and the author of, most recently, the novel “Purity.”

Regards,

Rob Such

rob
07900 488 936
01344 988 775
www.rsrenewables.com

@rsrenewables
RS Renewables Ltd stores and uses personal data to be able work with you in relation to a contract we have/are working to put in place with you or the company you represent, or to investigate whether you would be interested in working with RS Renewables Ltd. Please see our info

Decision for access to half-hourly electricity data for settlement purposes | Ofgem

Ofgem are finally going public on the real reason they want every home to have a smart meter – so you can be billed in half hourly chunks. This has always been the plan so why have an advertising campaign that pretends that smart meters will save consumers money by making them better informed about their energy consumption?

https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/publications-and-updates/decision-access-half-hourly-electricity-data-settlement-purposes?utm_medium=email&utm_source=dotMailer&utm_campaign=Daily-Alert_25-06-2019&utm_content=Decision+for+access+to+half-hourly+electricity+data+for+settlement+purposes&dm_i=1QCB,6COIH,F31GLA,P47UT,1

Decision for access to half-hourly electricity data for settlement purposes

In order to settle customers half-hourly, suppliers need access to their customers’ half-hourly data from their smart meter. Under the current rules, domestic consumers’ half-hourly consumption data can only be accessed for settlement if they have given opt-in consent, and suppliers can only access half-hourly data from microbusinesses for settlement if they have not opted-out. As part of our work on market-wide settlement reform we have been considering the future of these rules, as well as other issues related to data access for settlement. In July 2018 we published a consultation seeking views on a number of questions, in order to realise t the benefits of settlement reform whilst ensuring that consumers’ privacy is appropriately safeguarded. Alongside the consultation document we also published a Data Protection Impact Assessment (DPIA).

We have carefully considered the responses to our consultation and are now setting out our decisions, set out in this decision document. Alongside the decision document we are also publishing an updated version (version 2) of our DPIA, which reflects the decisions made following the consultation.

Regards,

Rob Such

rob07900 488 936
01344 988 775
www.rsrenewables.com

@rsrenewables

RS Renewables Ltd stores and uses personal data to be able work with you in relation to a contract we have/are working to put in place with you or the company you represent, or to investigate whether you would be interested in working with RS Renewables Ltd. Please see our i<a href="mailto:nfo

Solar farms could be wildlife havens that tackle biodiversity crisis | New Scientist

https://www.newscientist.com/article/2207491-solar-farms-could-be-wildlife-havens-that-tackle-biodiversity-crisis/?utm_medium=NLC&utm_source=NSNS&utm_campaign=2019-0626-GLOBAL-NSDAY&utm_content=NSDAY

Solar farms could be wildlife havens that tackle biodiversity crisis

Are solar farms good for biodiversity?Adrian Arbib/Alamy

By Adam Vaughan

Solar farms could help address the UK’s biodiversity crisis by providing habitats and food for wildlife, according to research gathered by a new project.

The online SPIES tool by the Universities of Lancaster and York found evidence from 450 peer-reviewed papers for actions solar farm owners can take to benefit nature, such as planting and maintaining hedgerows.

“There is limited research on the impacts of solar parks, hence the tool,” says Alona Armstrong of Lancaster University, who developed it with the solar industry, plus conservation groups, ecologists, landowners and the UK’s National Farmers’ Union. …

Regards,

Rob Such

rob07900 488 936
01344 988 775
www.rsrenewables.com

@rsrenewables

RS Renewables Ltd stores and uses personal data to be able work with you in relation to a contract we have/are working to put in place with you or the company you represent, or to investigate whether you would be interested in working with RS Renewables Ltd. Please see our i<a href="mailto:nfo

Seven charts that explain what net zero emissions means for the UK | New Scientist

https://www.newscientist.com/article/2201416-seven-charts-that-explain-what-net-zero-emissions-means-for-the-uk/

Seven charts that explain what net zero emissions means for the UK

The Committee on Climate Change has urged the government to adopt a target of net zero emissions by 2050. These seven charts show how that might unfold, and what it means for the UK economy

Environment 2 May 2019

Universal Images Group North America LLC/Alamy Stock Photo

By Adam Vaughan

Here’s a selection of some of the most pertinent numbers that the Committee on Climate Change has compiled for the government in its report, ranging from expectations about the UK’s future emissions, sectors which it expects will emit the most greenhouse gases and some surprising numbers about the transition to electric cars.

The UK has already cut greenhouse gas emissions 40 per cent on 1990 levels, looking solely at “territorial” emissions, rather than ones based on consumption of imported goods and services. Before 2050, there are interim targets, including a 57 per cent cut by 2030, which the government admits it’s currently set to miss.

Previous cuts have been very uneven across the economy. The heavy lifting has been done by the power sector booting out coal in favour of more renewable sources and gas power stations. According to the most recent numbers, transport has replaced the power sector as the biggest emitter.

This chart shows the UK’s impact on global temperature, relative to now, from adopting a net zero target compared to today’s 80 per cent plan. As the line goes up, we are adding to global warming. As it goes down, the UK contributes to global cooling.

Today, farming and aviation are relatively small emitters compared to other sectors. But if the net zero target is achieved, their hard-to-treat nature means they will be the big two remaining rumps of emissions in 2050. That is why negative emissions measures are needed, such as tree-planting.

In the past, most of the emissions cuts have happened behind the scenes, through technological changes. Kettles still boil the same, regardless of whether powered by electrons generated from a coal power station or wind farm. This chart shows how more than 60 per cent of future measures require some sort of consumer behaviour changes too.

The government plans to ban new petrol and diesel car sales by 2040, but a 2030 goal would save more money, says the Committee on Climate Change. Switching to electric cars will cost society around £1bn a year in the early 2020s, in terms of costs of buying the cars, investing in energy networks and charging points. Later, they are expected to save the UK billions of pounds annually.

One of the Committee on Climate Change’s key findings is the cost of a net zero target will be the same as the existing one of an 80 per cent cut. That’s because the cost of technologies has fallen rapidly since the current target was enshrined in law 11 years ago. This chart shows just how much faster the cost of batteries has fallen than the group originally expected.

Regards,

Rob Such

rob
07900 488 936
01344 988 775
www.rsrenewables.com

RS Renewables Ltd stores and uses personal data to be able work with you in relation to a contract we have/are working to put in place with you or the company you represent, or to investigate whether you would be interested in working with RS Renewables Ltd. Please see our i<a href="mailto:nfo